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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports on results from a 3-year Australian Research Council-
funded project entitled Climate Change and the Public Sphere (CCPS). The 
aims of this project were to develop regionally specific climate change 
scenarios: and utilise these scenarios in interviews with members of the public 
in the Australian Capital Region, as well as run a deliberative forum on climate 
change policy options.  
Overall, the CCPS project was founded on the rationale that, while there now 
exists rigorous data on projected changes to the Australian climate, a definite 
knowledge gap remains regarding possible individual and collective behavioural 
responses to such changes. National opinion polls indicate waxing and waning levels 
of public concern around climate change, coupled with variations in amount and tone 
of media coverage (e.g. seeBoykoff 2007). While opinion polls can provide some 
indication of public perceptions and prioritizations of climate change relative to other 
social and environmental issues, they reveal little about potential individual and 
collective reactions to different climate change futures. Thus, work into public 
responses to climate change needs to go beyond opinion polling to more in-depth 
explorations of public values and potential responses (Adger, Brown et al. 2003). 
However, such research presents a number of methodological and epistemological 
challenges.  For one, how to effectively present sound information about potential 
impacts of future climate change has become an area of considerable debate. 
Despite continuous advances in modelling, there inevitably exist high levels of 
uncertainty about how climate changes might play out (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 
2006). Yet, sound and trustworthy information is still crucial, with some research 
suggesting that accurate knowledge about the causes of climate change is positively 
correlated with pro-environmental behavioural intentions (Bord, O'Connor et al. 
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2000): a hypothesis made more salient by the often-polarized and misinformed 
nature of some public media commentary (e.g. (Kitcher 2010): 1232).  
Another considerable challenge—in terms of gauging responses to climate change 
information as a marker of (future or current) adaptive action—is that asking 
individuals what they think they would do in a certain situation does not capture 
what they actually do, and will, do. Human adaptive action cannot be predicted 
because of contingencies in decision-making processes and uncertainty about which 
potential adaptive capacities can and will be put into practice (e.g. see Berkhout and 
Hertin 2000; Vincent 2007). However, such limitations do not undermine the 
necessity of understandings how particular events and approaches to addressing 
climate change are reacted to and evaluated by the public, here and now (see 
(Adger and Kelly 1999). Decades of research into public understanding of 
environmental issues have underscored the importance of situating ‘local’ knowledge 
and perceptions as central to future environmental management strategies (Burgess 
et al 1988). Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding climate change means the nature of 
the problem itself is open to debate:  hence the need to know ‘what the stakes really 
are and the assumptions about the natural and social world made by each of the 
actors involved’ (Pellizzoni 2003).  
In responses to these challenges, the CCPS project further developed and extended 
a methodology previously piloted on this subject in the UK in 2003 (see Niemeyer et 
al 2005). In terms of the arguments of this paper, the key components of this 
project’s methodology were the following. 
1. Develop regionally specific and visually accessible climate change 
scenarios 
2. Use the above scenarios in face-to-face interviews with individual 
members of the ACR public to explore and measure their reactions 
to the scenarios 
3. Run a deliberative forum with a sample of participants from 2. To 
explore the effect that public debate and further information about 
climate change has on responses 
The remainder of this paper will focus on 1 and 2 above in turn, with a brief 
discussion of 3 (which is the focus of other papers in preparation). 
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1. Develop regionally specific and visually accessible climate change 
scenarios 
The use of scenarios has become an integral part of the climate change researchers 
toolkit, from both a scientific and social research perspective (seeRosentrater 2010) 
for a review of use of scenarios and climate change). Scenarios can be defined as 
‘plausible stories about how the future might unfold from existing patterns, new 
factors and alternative human choices’ (Raskin 2005:134): stories that can span a 
range of scales, timeframes and components. They have been utilized for numerous 
purposes, such as modelling future greenhouse gas emission levels under differing 
socio-economic ‘storylines’ (Arnell, Livermore et al. 2004) and/or as tools to build 
collaborative visions of alternative futures in conjunction with stakeholders ‘which 
bind together communities of decision-makers and enable them to change behaviour 
in response to changed images of the future’ (Berkhout, Hertin et al. 2002). 
In this project, the aim was to construct climate scenarios (as opposed to socio-
economic scenarios: see (Lorenzoni and Hulme 2009) for discussion of this 
distinction) to represent impacts of projected climate changes within the ACR up to 
2100: and to visually represent these scenarios in the form of diagrams, charts, and 
map for use in interviews with members of the public from within the ACR. The ACR-
scale was chosen because, as Shackley and Deanwood (Shackley and Deanwood 
2002) suggest ‘there is a better prospect for mobilizing stakeholder interest and 
concern if climate change impacts can be demonstrated ‘on the ground’, with 
acknowledgement of the challenges of down-scaling scenarios to the regional level 
(see Cohen, Neilsen et al. 2006). To this end, social researchers from the ACR 
project worked in close conjunction with climate modellers and other natural 
scientists over the course of 18 months to down-scale national level scenarios to the 
regional scale.   
The scenarios for the ACR were developed using CSIRO’s OzClim model, which 
contains patterns of regional changes in climate projected from 23 different global 
climate models run by CSIRO and other research centres and archived at the 
Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI). The model 
enables users to select from six SRES scenarios (taken from the ‘Special Report on 
Emissions’) and two commonly used CO2 concentration stabilisation scenarios to 
generate projections for any of the available global climate models (IPCC 2000; Stern 
2006; Garnaut 2008).  
 4 
The scenarios and models used to generate them are outlined in Appendix A. In 
brief, the scenarios presented to participants were based on ‘medium’ and ‘high’ 
emissions trajectories associated with the SRES A1B and the SRES A1FI scenarios 
respectively. The emissions trajectories and time slice reference points are shown in 
Figure 1. As a reference point, a baseline scenario for the year 1990 was developed 
based on the average climate over a 30-year period (1976-2005). The two scenarios 
were then produced with climate parameters produced for two timeline slices. The 
first time-slice was 2050. This was the year that participants were asked to situate 
themselves in during the interview. In addition, it was also decided to add a second 
time-slice at 2100. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, the differences in 
climatic impact between the two scenarios at 2050 were relatively small and thus 
likely to produce relatively small differences in response. Second reason was that 
adding 2100 provided information about the trajectory of change that would be 
expected under that scenario. In other words, we were asking individuals to respond 
to the climate that they were experiencing in 2050 as well as the climate that might 
be expected by 2100 if emissions continued on under that scenario. This approach 
also sought to address a potential underestimation of perceived impacts that was 
identified in relation to the earlier Birmingham climate change study (Niemeyer, Petts 
et al. 2004). 




The climate modelling team were then given the task of producing the climatic 
impact for the two time slices for each scenario. The impacts covered a range of 
climatic variables relating to temperature, rainfall, growing range for key species and 
‘climatic domain representation. These parameters are listed below. In most cases 
the information was produced in map form, except where indicated as ‘data’, in 
which case the information was provided as climate data for the main geographical 
reference point. 
Temperature 
• Annual Mean 
• Mean Min and Max (Annual, 
Monthly, Seasonal) (Data) 
• Frost Days 
• Hot Days 
• Heatwave Days 
• Heatwave Length 
Rainfall 
• annual mean 




Indicator Species (climatic range) 
• Grapes 
• Redbox 
 ‘Climatic Domain Representation’ 
• Combined (six parameters); 
Temperature and Rainfall 
 
Translating the maps produced by the climate modelling team into a format that 
could be readily used in the scenario interviews involved cleaning up the raw images 
produced by the modelling software, simplifying the categories and fine-tuning the 
colour gradients. An example of a finished set of maps showing annual mean 
temperature can be found in Figure 2. Each map showed the reference study area 
and major town centres as reference points. 
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Figure 2. Annual Average Rainfall Maps 
 
To further enhance the ability to communicate the impacts associated with the 
scenarios it was decided to animate the maps. This involved animating the 
transitions between the scenario time slices (baseline to 2050; and 2050 to 2100) so 
that participants could visualise the changes. The animations also indicate the 
changes that occur at the reference point (Canberra Airport) by indicating the value 
for the parameter being shown next to the map legend and moving the reference 
point along the legend as the slide proceeds to the next time slice.  
The figures below show slides for the three time slices for the average annual 
temperature maps. It can be seen from the slides that the timeframe for that 
particular slide is indicated at the top of the slide by highlighting the relevant year on 
the timescale. The left hand side of each slide shows the legend and the relative 
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value of the climate parameter for the geographical reference point, which slides 
along the legend as the presentation moves to the next slide. The slides also show 




Figure 3. Scenario Presentation Slides: Annual Mean Temperature (ACT) 
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The data produced by the climate modelling (monthly and seasonal temperature; 
and monthly and seasonal rainfall) was translated into animated bar graphs using 
Adobe Flash. An example of the high emissions graphs for the ACT are shown in 
Figure 4. The graphs begin with the baseline data showing the monthly minimum 
and maximum temperature as the upper and lower bounds of the bars for each 
month. The average annual temperature is shown as the line through the bar. As the 
animation proceeds through each of the time slices the original baseline bar remains 
in place as a reference point showing the magnitude of change for each month, with 
the figures showing the change to the average mean temperature for each season 
shown at the top of the graph.  
The final slide shows the summary graph at the end of the animation, where the 
bars for baseline, 2050 and 2100 are shown alongside one another for reference. 
Experience from piloting the data with participants showed that individuals use 
different strategies when reading and translating the data into meaningful 
experience. Some individuals preferred using the maps, other preferred the values 
shown in the animations, while some preferred the use of the graphs. The objective 
in developing the scenarios was to provide as wide an array of strategies as possible 
so that the study could accommodate the different needs of individuals 
Another strategy to communicate the magnitude of climate impacts was to use a 
geographic reference point showing where the climate was ‘migrating to’ under the 
different scenarios (see Figure 5). Initially the modelling was done to identify a single 
point on the map representing a position where the climate closely approximated 
that which the reference point (ACT) would experience under that scenario, based 
on 6 climate parameters (rainfall and temperature). However, it was not possible to 
find a close fit within the range shown on the maps in the SE of Australia with a high 
degree of confidence. So it was decided to represent points on the map showing the 
best fit for anticipated rainfall and temperature separate, with the addition to the 
best overall fit possible.  
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Figure 5. Climate Domain Representation Slides (ACT High Emissions Scenario) 
 








Figure 5 shows the climate of Canberra moving northward under the high emissions 
scenario, with rainfall and temperature diverging as the scenario progresses. The 
location of towns on the map provided a useful reference point for participants to 
develop a meaningful understanding of what sort of change would actually occur 
under that scenario. For example, most participants knew that Cobar (where the 
temperature for the ACT migrates to under the 2100 high emissions scenario) is an 
extremely hot location, which often achieves the highest maximum temperature for 
the state of New South Wales. 
The potential distribution of key species (Blakely’s red gum in the case of an existing 
species that is key to many local ecosystems; and wine grapes, which is the most 
important agricultural crop in the region) was used to illustrate where in Australia the 
baseline climate was migrating toward. This was particularly the case for Blakely’s 
red gum, shown in Figure 6, where there is a clear southward migration of the 
climate southward and into the mountainous regions of SE Australia. The small area 
of appropriate climatic circumstances in the very highest mountains of the Australian 
Alps for the high emissions scenario in 2100 was also useful for communicating the 
displacement of the ecosystems in those regions and the likely extinction of species 
that currently inhabit them. 
The suitability of climate for growing wine grapes was determined by ‘grape growing 
days’ (see Figure 7). Under the scenarios this translated into a rapidly diminishing 
area suitable for growing grapes — again, retreating into the mountainous areas 
which are predominantly protected as national parks, highlighting the potential for 
land use conflict. The maps themselves did not turn out to closely match the actual 
regions where grapes are grown. Some existing growing regions were not shown on 
the baseline map; and many areas shown as suitable for grapes actually covered 
regions where there are inappropriate soils etc. Nevertheless, the exercise was 
useful for communicating the way in which the baseline climate would migrate under 
each of the scenarios. And those individuals who were informed about and sensitive 
to the potential for growing grapes were able to calibrate the changes observed in 
the maps against their understanding of the areas in which grapes are actually 
grown. 
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1.1.1. Other Climate Impacts 
A range of other impacts were also communicated as part of the scenario 
presentations. These include impacts associated with water availability, the potential 
for forest fires (or ‘bushfires’ to use the local term) and health impacts. The first two 
in particular were chosen because of their salience in the region as important issues. 
Water supply shortages have lead to restrictions across the study region. The 
imposition of water restrictions was well known and understood by all participants, 
so the scenarios were developed to project the level of water restriction that would 
be experienced under that scenario in 2050. For example, the water availability slide 
in Figure 8 shows a 38% decrease in water availability compared to the baseline 
timeframe, resulting in a level 4 restriction as the average level of restriction 
experienced. 
Figure 8. Water Availability Slide (High Emissions Scenario) 
 
Bushfires are increasingly important issue in Australia. The study region had 
experienced a particularly severe bushfire in the summer of 2003 that resulted in the 
loss of 400 homes in the ACT. The level of fire danger is advertised on road signs 
that are familiar to all local residents, showing a dial with a pointer within the range 
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of threat ranging from Low to Catastrophic. This sign was used as a method for 
communicating the fire risk under each of the scenarios, as shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Fire Risk Slide (ACT; High Emissions Scenario) 
 
 
Finally, the health impacts associated with each scenario were presented. Obtaining 
relevant and plausible figures for health impacts actually proved very difficult. So it 
was decided to show some of the better developed figures for the anticipated impact 
at 2050, alongside a general description of the associated impacts, so the 
participants could develop an understanding of how climate change would be likely 
to impact on health under that scenario. This was the only departure from a design 
principle for the scenarios whereby only concrete impacts would be presented. 
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Figure 10. Health Impact Slide (ACT; High Emissions Scenario) 
 
 
2. Use the above scenarios in face-to-face interviews with individual 
members of the ACR public to explore and measure their reactions to the 
scenarios 
In May 2010 a total of 104 face-to-face interviews were held in the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) and the Goulburn-Mulwaree (G-M) region. Interviewees were 
recruited through sending out written invitations to participate to 2000 households in 
the ACR, selected randomly from the electoral roll. Of these, 262 people registered 
an interest (188 from the ACT, 74 from G-M): of these, the research team were able 
to interview 104 in the allotted time-frame. The actual participants were selected on 
a random stratified basis using both attitudinal and demographic criteria. Emphasis 
was placed on recruiting a wide variety of beliefs about climate change among the 
participants, which ranged from deep sceptics, to deep concern about the climate 
change issue. The interviews were conduced over a two-hour period following a pre-
established protocol, which is summarised in the table below and discussed in 
greater detail in the remainder of this section 
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Table 1.Protocol for individual face-to-face interviews 
1.1.1. Component 1.1.2. Data Collected  
1. Introductions and initial opening questions on 
attitudes to climate change 
Qualitative interview data1 
2. Baseline Opinion Charting=(a)policy 
preference exercise; (b)Q-sort; and 
(c)‘Willingness to Pay’ (WtP) exercise 
Quantitative data from Opinion 
Charting; qualitative 
conversational data 
3. Presentation and Discussion of the ‘Medium’ 
Scenario 
Qualitative conversational data 
4. Repeat Opinion charting minus WtP exercise Quantitative data from Opinion 
Charting; qualitative 
conversational data 
5. Presentation and Discussion of ‘High’ Scenario Qualitative conversational data 
6. Repeat stage 4. Quantitative data from Opinion 
Charting; qualitative 
conversational data 
7. Final WtP exercise and semi-structured 
discussion on experiences and thoughts on taking 
part in the interview 
WtP data; qualitative interview 
data 
In these interviews, the scenarios discussed above were communicated to 
participants using iWork ’09 KeyNote software. The aim here was to present these 
scenarios as ‘learning’ rather than ‘truth’ machines (Berkhout et al 2002). It was 
stressed to participants that the scenarios were not to be taken as read, but that 
they represented plausible climate futures that might be anticipated under the two 
emissions trajectories constructed for the CCPS project. However, for the purposes 
of the interview, participants were asked to suspend any disbelief when looking at 
the scenarios and to try and imagine that they were actually experiencing the 
change in climate that was being represented in 2050, and that the climate would 
continue to change in that direction toward 2100. Most participants, apart from a 
few deep climate sceptics, demonstrated that they were able to imagine themselves 
                                            
1 All interviews were recorded, with participants consent. Recordings were continuous 
throughout the interview, to capture aside comments and reactions of the participants. 
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in that future that was being presented to them, which is partly indicated by the 
changes in response to the survey questions being asked of them, which will be 
discussed below. 
As stated above, one of the aims of this project was to explore reactions to the 
above scenarios, to gauge both current perceptions of climate change as well as 
possible future behavioural responses. To this end, a specific methodological tool 
was developed using ‘Opinion Charting’ based on Q methodology. 
1.1.3. Opinion Charting 
Opinion charting involves a suite of approaches combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods to develop an understanding of the dynamics surrounding a 
particular issue.  The opinion charting exercise involves two distinct components.  
The main component draws on an established method (Q methodology, see 
Appendix B) that involves participants responding to individual statements pertaining 
to climate change.  The second component involves participants ranking a series of 
policy options relating to climate change adaptation policies. Analysis of the data 
combines these components, in conjunction with other observations — such as 
interview transcripts and dialogue from the deliberative forum.  
The Q method component of opinion charting looks beyond aggregate responses to 
particular questions or statements, as is usually the case for survey research. 
Instead, it explores the way in which responses interrelate as part of a particular 
worldview or perspective.2 For this study we were seeking to identity different 
discourses relating to climate change and climate change adaptation, with a 
particular focus on governance. This sort of assumption is implicit in the kind of 
labelling that is commonly applied to different kinds of positions (Left/Right on the 
political spectrum, environmentalist versus pro-development etc.).  The strength of 
the approach used in Q methodology is that it does not automatically assume the 
nature of these positions prior to the analysis.  Rather, it seeks to discover how 
                                            
2 Repeated studies have found that small numbers of research participants can produce 
robust and externally valid results, as long as there is a good representation of different 
perspectives — ‘discursive representation’, as opposed to descriptive representation of 
demographic variables (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008) — because of the tendency for 
perspectives to be from similar patterns throughout a wider population. Large sample sizes 
are possible, although, because of the intensive nature of the method the resources 
required increase substantially, usually with relatively little additional benefit.  There is also 
a large trade-off when combining the analysis with a deliberative event where larger 
numbers tend to reduce the ability to implement an effective forum. 
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different positions coalesce around climate change.  In other words, the analysis 
‘discovers’ how positions have formed around the issue, rather than making 
assumptions beforehand about what these positions are likely to be. 
Although the methodology can be used to provide a snapshot of an issue, it has also 
been used in this study as a tool for understanding the changes that might occur as 
part of a dose-response study — here in relation to different climate change 
scenarios and resulting from participation in a deliberative forum on climate change 
adaptation.   
The nature of the changes can provide valuable data about the dynamics of the 
issue; how it might unfold as climate changes; and how this might be different under 
deliberative conditions. Any observed changes provide insight into the possible 
differences between positions as they currently stand and how they might evolve 
under different futures.  Part of this involves a kind of dose-response analysis: 
investigating why observed changes occurred during deliberations and whether these 
observations reveal aspects of the issue that might be resolvable by specific 
approaches. 
1.1.4. Opinion Charting Instrument 
As previously stated, the opinion charting exercise involves two parts: performing a 
Q sort and a policy ranking option.  Thirty-three statements were used in the Q 
sorting component of the opinion chart, while the policy ranking involved the 
presentation of seven options. The 33 statements used in the study are listed in 
Table 2. In addition to the Q sort and option ranking, participants also completed a 
willingness to pay exercise (not reported on here). 
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1 There is not enough information to definitively say that climate change is real. 
2 The response to climate change is not going to be positive.  The same 
mistakes will keep happening. 
3 Climate variation is normal, so why should this be a problem? 
4 More educational programmes are needed to increase public awareness about 
climate change. 
5 Climate change will not be a problem because there will be technological 
solutions available. 
6 I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 
7 I don’t trust what I hear about climate change from government. 
8 We need strong political leadership to do something about climate change. 
9 I think it is safe to say climate change is here. 
10 I’m not going to do anything to address climate change because it is not a 
major issue. 
11 There’s not much point in me doing anything to fix this. No-one else is going 
to. 
12 It’s difficult to trust what comes out in the media on the issue of climate 
change. 
13 It is already too late to do anything, as any action to stop climate change will 
take a long time to take effect. 
14 I’m not concerned enough to do anything drastic about this, such as 
participate in political action. 
15 It is unfair that we are going to leave the climate in a mess for future 
generations. 
16 We should pay for greenhouse emissions. 
17 We can adapt to the coming changes. 
18 It is clear that we are already entering the zone of dangerous climate change. 
19 I care about the planet. 
20 I don’t know what to do. I’m very concerned and would like to do something, 
but I don’t have a realistic shortlist of things that would really make a 
difference. 
21 Australia does not owe it to the rest of the world to reduce emissions and 
suffer economically. 
22 If Australia reduces greenhouse gases it won’t make a difference. That will just 
shift Australian jobs to other countries.  
23 This is so depressing and is so out of our control. 
24 I believe that the difference we can have as an individual, in Australia, is so 
minimal that our actions are worthless. 
25 Australia is particularly vulnerable to climate change, and it is in our interest to 
help find an effective global solution. 
26 We need laws addressing climate change because people are not going to 
volunteer to change.  
27 I want to do something, but it is too big and too hard. 
28 When I read in the paper that climate change is not true, I start to have 
doubts about whether it is changing. 
29 Doing something to reduce emissions feels a bit hopeless but I just want to 
feel that I’m doing the most I can. 
30 The fate of the planet is too important to be left to market forces. 
31 Australia's emissions are tiny, so it’s not up to us to act. 
32 Governments should take a far greater role in preparing towns and cities to 
adapt to the impacts of climate change. 
33 Failure to address climate change is the fault of political leaders. 
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3. Run a deliberative forum with a sample of participants from 2. to 
explore the effect that public debate and further information about climate 
change has on responses  
The final key component of the CCPS methodology was a deliberative forum held at 
the end May 2010, where 40 individuals who had taken part in the interviews in 
stage 2 were randomly selected and invited to participate (with 34 attending and 
completing the forum). The forum ran for 3 consecutive days (Friday 28-Sunday 30 
May) then again for 1 day on the following Saturday (5 June). A detailed timetable 
for these 4 days is shown in Table 3. 
The public participants were joined by 15 academics, a project/research team of 7, a 
professional facilitator, and an array of local policy actors. Overall the aims of this 
process were to enable participants to learn more about the issues featured in the 
scenarios through presentations by academic and policy experts on each of the 
topics. The roles of the speakers, rather than utilizing the ‘outreach model’ of 
education, experts functioned more as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Brand and Karvonen 
2007), in an attempt to create a democratic mode of social inquiry and expose the 
values and assumptions behind science to public scrutiny and input. In addition, the 
deliberative process aimed to provide the opportunity for participants to debate with 
each other and question experts further about the facts and values underpinning 
climate change debates.  Thus, whereas the one-to-one interviews provided 
opportunities for ‘instrumental’ learning, the deliberative processes created the space 
to both deepen this learning and also engage in ‘communicative learning’ (Petts 
2007).  Finally, a further goal was to work towards making policy recommendations 
for preferred local and regional adaptive actions. In terms of the latter goal, given 
the governance, social and environmental differences between the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Goulburn-Mulwaree region, after the initial two days of 
deliberation, the groups was split in two.  Thus, day 3 was conducted with G-M 
participants only in the city of Goulburn: and day 4 was conducted with ACT 
participants only, in Canberra. 
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1 The Australian National 
University, Canberra 
Ice-breaker and setting deliberative 
ground-rules; Initial Opinion 
Charting; presentations on the 
science and socio-economic 
aspects of climate change; small 
group-break out sessions and 
questions to the floor; group meal 
in the evening 
38 
2 The Australian National 
University, Canberra 
Presentations on bio-physical 
impacts and international politics of 
climate change; group exercise and 
debate on approaches to 
adaptation and mitigation 
36 
3 Goulburn Workers’ Club, 
Goulburn, New South 
Wales 
Small and whole group 
deliberations on priorities for 
action; and recommended policy 
approaches, with on-site feedback 
from local policy makers; final 
Opinion Charting; feedback and 





4 The Australian National 
University, Canberra 
Small and whole group 
deliberations on priorities for 
action; and recommended policy 
approaches, with on-site feedback 
from local policy makers; final 
Opinion Charting; feedback and 
reflection on process and research 





The results presented below are preliminary at this stage. Analysis is currently 
ongoing, with the final report on the project due to be completed by the end of 
2010.  
2.1. Climate Change Discourses 
The analysis has identified four climate change discourses among the participants: 
A. Generalised Concern 
B. Governance-Oriented Imperative 
C. Adaptive Optimism 
D. Governance-Focussed Vexation 
Figure 11 provides a summary of the four discourses in the form of an overlapping 
Venn diagram. The diagram allocates the themes attributable to each of the 
discourses according to which discourses they are associated with. The themes 
themselves are derived from the statements that are associated with the factors 
according to the z-score (the higher the z-score, the strongly the association of a 
statement with a discourse). The z-scores for all statements for each of the four 
discourses are provided in Table 2. 
It can be seen from Figure 11 that the four discourses overlap considerable on a 
number of issues. Not shown in the figure is a ‘consensus’ that the climate change 
issue requires strong political leadership. Although the figure shows four discourses, 
strictly speaking, there are actually five discourses. The final discourse is the inverse 
of discourse B, representing a strongly sceptical view of both the very existence of 
climate change and the need to do something about it. 
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Figure 11. Climate Change Discourses Diagram 
 
 
The layout of the discourses in Figure 11 can be viewed in terms of a number of 
axes representing shared features of the discourses. For example, dicourses A and B 
share a relatively unspecific concern about climate change (climate change is 
probably an important issue in the future, but it is not one at the moment — 
although that does not mean nothing needs to be done about it). Discourses B and C 
treat climate change as a more immediate and urgent issue. 
The relative urgency of the climate change issue differs between A and B at the 
concerned end of the spectrum, compared to a relative bonhomie for C and D. This 
is not to say that C and D are not concerned about the issue. Rather, it is not 
something that we need to panic about (yet).  Discourse C in particular is optimistic 
that something can be done to adapt to the changes, even if it is too late to do 
something about them. 
There is a governance dimension that distinguishes discourse A and C to D and B. A 
and C tend not to make heavy demands of government, whereas B and D are 
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strongly concerned that the government is not doing enough (and discourse B 
exhibits some anger about this issue). Discourse C is, again, optimistic about what 
can be done to adapt to climate change without the heavy hand of government. 
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Table 2. Statement Z-scores for each of the four discourses 
No. Statement A B C D 
1 There is not enough information to definitively say that 
climate change is real. 0.05 -1.85 -2.05 1.06 
2 The response to  climate change is not going to be 
positive.  The same mistakes will keep happening. -0.47 0.13 -0.59 -0.54 
3 Climate variation is normal, so why should this be a problem? -0.08 -1.51 -0.54 -0.90 
4 More educational programmes are needed to increase 
public awareness about climate change. 1.27 0.50 0.83 0.96 
5 Climate change will not be a problem because there will 
be technological solutions available. -0.32 -1.05 1.63 0.24 
6 I don’t trust what scientists say about climate change. 0.07 -1.32 -2.07 -0.67 
7 I don’t trust what I hear about climate change from government. 0.99 0.05 -0.64 -0.63 
8 We need strong political leadership to do something 
about climate change. 1.00 1.43 1.18 1.23 
9 I think it is safe to say climate change is here. 0.81 1.48 1.82 0.44 
10 I’m not going to do anything to address climate change 
because it is not a major issue. -1.70 -1.53 -0.89 -1.26 
11 There’s not much point in me doing anything to fix this. 
No-one else is going to. -1.74 -0.69 -0.96 -0.98 
12 It’s difficult to trust what comes out in the media on the 
issue of climate change. 1.62 0.08 -0.04 0.10 
13 It is already too late to do anything, as any action to 
stop climate change will take a long time to take effect. -1.58 -0.44 0.48 -0.96 
14 I’m not concerned enough to do anything drastic about 
this, such as participate in political action. -0.78 -1.09 -0.43 -0.38 
15 It is unfair that we are going to leave the climate in a 
mess for future generations. 1.12 1.24 0.65 0.75 
16 We should pay for greenhouse emissions. 0.27 0.73 0.80 0.94 
17 We can adapt to the coming changes. 0.59 -0.56 1.95 0.75 
18 It is clear that we are already entering the zone of 
dangerous climate change. -0.58 1.45 0.70 0.52 
19 I care about the planet. 2.05 0.97 0.61 1.04 
20 I don’t know what to do. I’m very concerned and would 
like to do something, but I don’t have a realistic shortlist 
of things that would really make a difference. -0.81 0.13 0.55 0.34 
21 Australia does not owe it to the rest of the world to 
reduce emissions and suffer economically. -0.09 -0.89 -0.99 -1.76 
22 If Australia reduces greenhouse gases it won’t make a 
difference. That will just shift Australian jobs to other countries.  -0.11 -0.72 -0.96 -1.53 
23 This is so depressing and is so out of our control. -1.55 0.45 -1.21 -0.98 
24 I believe that the difference we can have as an individual, in 
Australia, is so minimal that our actions are worthless. -1.18 -0.50 0.43 -1.33 
25 Australia is particularly vulnerable to climate change, and it 
is in our interest to help find an effective global solution. 1.05 0.90 1.07 0.75 
26 We need laws addressing climate change because people 
are not going to volunteer to change.  0.56 1.14 0.17 1.60 
27 I want to do something, but it is too big and too hard. -1.51 0.09 0.05 -0.46 
28 When I read in the paper that climate change is not true, 
I start to have doubts about whether it is changing. -0.16 -1.19 -0.85 -0.78 
29 Doing something to reduce emissions feels a bit hopeless 
but I just want to feel that I’m doing the most I can. 0.51 0.35 -0.11 0.49 
30 The fate of the planet is too important to be left to market forces. 0.89 1.45 0.06 1.55 
31 Australia's emissions are tiny, so it’s not up to us to act. -0.82 -1.03 -1.18 -1.74 
32 Governments should take a far greater role in preparing 
towns and cities to adapt to the impacts of climate change. 0.79 1.11 0.61 1.21 
33 Failure to address climate change is the fault of political leaders. -0.16 0.69 -0.08 0.93 
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2.2. Discursive Changes (scenarios and deliberation 
There are a number of ways in which the changes to the prevalence of each 
discourse changes under different stages of the CCPS study can be measured. Here 
two are used — discourse loading and discourse association. The first uses the factor 
loadings, which are analogous to a correlation between each individual Q sort and 
the array of z-scores for each discourse. The average factor loading for each 
discourse at each stage of the study (baseline, medium scenario, high scenario, 
followed by pre- and post-deliberation) is shown in Figure 12. The figure shows the 
results for those participants who finished the deliberative forum (n=34) as the solid 
bars, compared to the remainder of the participants who only participated in the 
scenario interviews (cross-hatched bars). The significance of changes between the 
baseline and medium scenarios and medium and high scenarios, as well as changes 
between pre- and post-deliberation are indicated by asterisks (*p<0.05, **p<0.01) 
based on a paired t-test for deliberative process participants. 
Figure 12. Average Factor Loadings 
 
The figure shows a clear migration away from discourse A and toward discourse B as 
the climate change scenarios increase in severity. There also appears to be a 
movement away from discourse D. Overall it appears from the figure that the 
positions have of participants have returned to their baseline status quo prior to 
deliberation. But this is not quite true, as will be seen. 
The second way that the changes to discourses can be observed at different stages 
of the study involves looking at the ‘migration’ of individuals between the discourses. 
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This is useful because using aggregate factor loadings does not provide any 
indication about the nature of the transformations and the particular trends within 
the overall movements.  
Figure 13 shows four schematic charts that use the discourse Venn diagram to plot 
the location of individuals and where they have moved to during the interim between 
different study stages. The top two plots show the migrations from baseline to the 
medium scenario and baseline to the high scenario. The bottom two plots show 
baseline to pre-deliberation and pre- to post-deliberation respectively. 
Figure 13.Migrations Between Discourses 
 
Baseline to Medium Scenario  
 
 
Baseline to Pre-deliberation  
 
Baseline to High Scenario  
 
 
Pre- to Post-deliberation 
 
 
The plots tell a similar story to the graph in Figure 12: there is an increasingly strong 
movement away from A and toward discourse B. In more specific terms there is a 
general East to Northwest movement away from A and D, clearly reflecting a 
movement away from the relative ambivalence about the reality of climate change 
toward a more much stronger sense of urgency. Note that the migration here is 
toward B and not C, reflecting a relatively high level of alarm and demands from 
government to act, while at the same time the level of faith in the ability of 
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democratic institutions to deliver has been undermined by a failure to act. This is a 
similar dynamic to that observed in the earlier Birmingham study, where the 
potential for a maladaptive response (not cooperating the regulatory policies, 
decreasing trust etc.) increased dramatically as the level of climate change became 
more severe (Niemeyer, Petts et al. 2004). 
What is also interesting is that, there is a greater amount of individual movement 
between the baseline and pre-deliberative stages for the deliberative forum 
participants than is indicated by the aggregate factor loading changes. Although the 
actual changes are relatively weak, the ‘baseline to pre-deliberation’ plot shows a net 
migration toward discourse C, which has carried on as a result of the deliberative 
forum. 
This movement toward C reflects increasing optimism about the potential for dealing 
with climate change. This optimism was verbally expressed by participants toward 
the end of the deliberative forum, even though they were also more aware of the 
potential for dangerous levels of climate change in their region. 
This is not to say that the deliberative forum merely continued the process that was 
begun by the experience of going through the scenarios as part of the interviews. 
There was much more going on, far too much to report here. But the results do 
suggest that the experience of going through the scenarios may have laid the 
foundations for the deliberative experience.  
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3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Given the early stages of analysis of the CCPS project data it is premature to draw 
definitive conclusions about the implications of the results. (Follow up interviews are 
currently underway.) What the study has revealed thus far is the utility of meaningful 
and locally relevant climate change scenarios as tools for developing an 
understanding of the potential dynamics of the public response and the challenges 
that might be faced. 
The responses to the scenarios suggest the potential for a maladaptive outcome as 
climate changes, where individuals turn against collective efforts to mitigate the 
impacts because of a perception of about systemic failures in the system of 
governance to deal with the climate change problem in the first place. In other 
words, the failure of government to deal with climate change at time t limits the 
potential for government to mobilise resources to adapt to climate changes at time 
t+1.  
This effect is observed in response to the scenarios even though only biophysical 
parameters are presented. It is interesting to consider the potential outcome if the 
wider implications of these sorts of responses are built into a second iteration of 
scenarios, whether there would be a positive feedback further undermining adaptive 
capacity. 
The CCPS study also investigated how responses to the potential for climate change 
evolved in response to participation in a deliberative forum. The results suggest that, 
although overall the positions of participants tended to return to the baseline, the 
very fact that they had been subjected to meaningful scenarios has had an impact 
on their perceptions about the climate change issue, sowing the seeds for a re-
evaluation of responses. 
Participation in a deliberative process tended to produce more positive responses to 
the potential for climate change, with greater optimism among participants about the 
possibilities for adaptation. This was observed both in the data and in the dialogue 
among deliberative participants. If resources had permitted, it would have been ideal 
to re-run the participants through the climate change scenarios to see how this 
improvement in what could be loosely referred to as ‘social capital’ has improved the 
potential for adaptation and climate change governance. Nevertheless, the results do 
suggest that deliberative capacity improves adaptive capacity.  
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Future research will seek to further develop these findings by building different social 
responses into scenarios and more directly testing the impact of different social and 
institutional settings on public responses. In the meantime, it is clear that the use of 
scenarios for exploring the public response to climate change and the limits to 
governance is an important and fertile field of study. 
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APPENDIX A. CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS 
1. Model Description 
1. Global Climate Model used to generate maps/data: Max Planck: 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM 
2. Specific Regions:  
1) ACT (covered in this paper). Reference location: Canberra Airport 
2) Goulburn Mulwaree Local Council Area. Reference location: Goulburn City 
Centre 
•  
3. Baseline (1990) – based on data for the 30 period (1976-2005) for each 
set of maps that are generated. This is a close approximation to the 1990 
baseline in OzClim. 
4. Three Emissions Scenarios:  
• ‘Low’: Stabilisation of greenhouse concentrations at 450ppm by 2100  
•  (equivalent to B1 SRES scenario) 
• ‘Medium’: A1B  
• ‘High’: A1FI 
5. Time slices:  Baseline (1990), 2050, 2100 (2020 and 2070 also used for 
development, but omitted from the study after piloting) 
6. Sensitivities: Medium sensitivity for low and medium emission scenarios, 
but high sensitivity for high emissions scenario 
7. Changes across scenarios generated as actual values (rather than as 
changes from baseline) 
8. Map coverage: South Eastern Australia  
9. Maps produced as pdf files: and amended into a form presentable to the 
public in adobe illustrator 
2. List of images and tables generated 
1. Present cases were produced for each series of maps or tables of figures 
•  
2. Signature species analysis: impacts of emission scenarios across the time 
slices on the distribution of: 
i. Blakely’s Red Gum 
ii. Wine grapes (as a signature agricultural crop) 
•  
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3. Bioclimatic analyses for each of the regions (Bega, Goulburn, ACT) across 
the emission scenarios and time slices (ie current locations of future climates 
for each of the regions) 
• These have been developed using the following six parameters: 
•   1. Annual Mean Temperature 
•   2. Max Temperature of Warmest Period 
•   3. Min Temperature of Coldest Period 
•   4. Annual Precipitation 
•   5. Precipitation of Warmest Quarter 
•   6. Precipitation of Coldest Quarter 
 
4. Tables of figures and maps for the range of emissions scenarios for the 
2020, 2050, 2070, 2100 time slices: 
•  
1) Rainfall (reported as actual): 
i. annual mean rainfall (maps) 
ii. calendar season rainfall (maps) 
iii. monthly rainfall (excel) 
2) Temperature (reported as actual): 
i. annual mean temperatures  
ii. annual mean minimum temperatures  
iii. annual mean maximum temperatures  
iv. mean maximum temperature for mid-summer [ie January] –
(see Dot point 4.viii) 
v. mean minimum temperature for mid-winter [ie July] (see Dot 
point 4.v) 
vi. extreme maximum temperatures  [NB. this is the ‘Maximum of 
maximum’/’Maximum of warmest month’ in Excel spreadsheet] 
vii. extreme minimum temperatures [NB. this is them‘Minimum of 
minimum’ in Excel spreadsheet/Minimum of coolest month] 
viii. mean minimum, mean maximum and mean temperatures for 
both winter and summer calendar seasons across the 
scenarios and time slices [If possible as per discussion with 
Tingbao] [Not received yet/Will only receive if possible] 
• [nb: we have seasonal rainfall maps, but not seasonal temperature maps... 
although we can generate data for these from the excel spreadsheet] 
5. Extreme weather parameters presented as maps and table of figures 
for each of the scenarios/time slices to include: 
i. No. of frost days per annum (less than or equal to 2°C minimum)  
ii. Mean no. of hot days (over 35°C) per annum (fire risk)  
iii. No. of heatwave days per annum (ie any day that occurs in at least a run of three 
days > 35°C) 
iv. Mean length of heatwaves  
v. Drought parameters:  
• Length 
• Amount of time in drought (%) 
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6. Excel spreadsheet with numerical data for each of the scenarios for 
each of the time slices for each region (for point source data for 
Canberra Airport, Goulburn Airport and Bega AWS):  
i. Heatwave Day (Any day that exists in a run of at least three days where the temperature is 
equal to or greater than 35°C)  
ii. Heatwave Length (No. of Heatwave days) Hot Days (equal to or greater than 
35°C) = Dot point 4.ii 
iii. Frost Days (minimum equal to or less than 2°C)  
iv. Monthly mean maximum temperature 
v. Monthly mean minimum temperature 
vi. Monthly mean temperature 
vii. Monthly mean rainfall 
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APPENDIX B. Q METHODOLOGY 
Q methodology has been demonstrated as a powerful tool for analysis of behaviour 
(Stephenson 1953; Brown 1980; Dryzek 1990), enabling an exploration of 
subjectivity that maintains robustness and external validity, particularly with small 
participant samples.3 It to both identify the predominant perspectives as well as 
measure the extent to which particular perspectives influence the subjectivity of 
individuals at different points in time (such as in relation to different climate change 
scenarios).  The methodology itself does not use the language of perspectives.  
Rather, the different perspectives around which individuals cluster are referred to in 
Q method as factors — reflecting the use of (inverted) factor analysis to elucidate 
these positions.  In this report, the term perspectives is used in place of the term 
factors. 
A Brief Description of Q Method 
In short, Q method involves the development of a set of statements reflective of the 
broader public discourse (or ‘concourse’ to use the language of Q). 
When developing the statements an initial pool of over 200 statements was collected 
by the research team from sources citing statements within the public sphere in 
relation to climate change in Australia, such as newspaper opinion pieces and letter 
to the editor. These were categorised and representative statements selected for 
piloting. A selection of 48 statements were used for a pilot study for the 
methodology, which was refined down to 33 statements used in the study proper. 
Once the statements used in the survey were finalised, the application of Q method 
to the study involved four discrete steps: 
Step 1: obtaining Q sorts from each participant (in this case both pre- and post-
deliberation); 
Step 2: extracting factors from the raw data (using inverted factor analysis); 
Step 3: applying rotation to the initial factors; and 
Step 4: interpreting and describing the resulting factors. 
                                            
3 It is also one of the few methodologies (particularly among those that are quantitative in 
nature) that is consistent with discourse theory (Blaug 1997) 
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a) Q Sorting 
The Q Sorting process involved organising the 33 cards containing the statements 
used in the study into three ‘piles’ — disagree, middle (unsure/indifferent), and 
agree.  From these piles the cards were sorted into eleven columns representing an 
array of responses from ‘most disagree’ to ‘most agree’, with column each subject to 
a maximum quota (referred to as a ‘forced’ sort), shown in Figure 14 as the shaded 
area. 
Figure 14 Q sort distribution 
 
 
The process usually involved choosing the extreme ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ cards, filling 
the quota for that column and moving toward the middle until all the cards are 
placed (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15.  Q Sorting Process 
 
 
b) Factor Extraction 
Step 2 involved the extraction of the initial subjective factors using inverted factor 
analysis.  In this case, this was performed using software that has been developed 
by the Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance Centre (FORQ), which used a 
Principle Components extraction method. 
c) Judgmental Rotation 
Step 3 Judgmental rotation was not performed on the data, because of the absence 
of clear criteria for doing so instead, a Varimax rotation was applied to the initial set 
of four factors.4 
                                            
4 It is possible to perform this process without recourse to manual rotation using an algorithm 
that maximises the correlations between factor loadings on subjective and preference 
factors.  The Deliberative Democracy Research Group has produced an algorithm to do this.  
However, in practice such an automated approach tends not produce high quality results 
compared to the use of manual rotation and more development is needed. 
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d) Factor Interpretation 
The final step of factor interpretation (Step 4) involves translating the results into 
factor scores, along with knowledge about those individuals that most typify a factor, 
to develop a description of the contents of the perspective that factor represents. 
These factor scores are one of two main quantitative outputs from the Q analysis, 
the other being factor loadings.  Factor scores comprise an array of responses to 
each of the Q Statements that are typical for that factor.  Put another way, if one 
can imagine an archetypal individual whose position perfectly reflects a particular 
factor, the responses in that individual’s Q Sort would be the same as the 
corresponding factor score for each statement. 
Factor loadings indicate extent of agreement of individuals with a particular factor 
using a measure that is similar to a correlation coefficient.  An archetypal individual, 
who is in perfect concordance with a factor would result in a factor loading of “1”.  
Alternative factor loading of “-1” indicates perfect disagreement with a factor, and a 
zero loading that there is no correlation. 
 
 
